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COMPETITION LAW IN INDONESIA: 
EXPERIENCE TO BE TAKEN FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 
 IN CHINA∗ 
DR. SYAMSUL MAARIF∗∗ 
The purpose of this piece is to articulate lessons that can be taken from 
the adoption and implementation of competition law in Indonesia. The 
Law, known as Law No. 5 of 1999 Concerning the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, (“Law No. 5 of 
1999”) was adopted in 1999. Many Indonesian lawyers agree that the Law 
is a revolutionary business legal reform, as it prohibits almost all business 
actors, including state-owned enterprises, from employing unfair business 
practices. Many of these practices were adopted by many business actors 
for tens of years. When the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1998, people 
suddenly realized that something was fundamentally wrong with the way 
Indonesian business actors conducted business and with the way the 
government developed its industrial and economic development policies. 
In addition, after years of economic calamity, signs of recovery are not yet 
on the horizon. Many big business players were supported by the 
government, which created barriers to fair trade. As a result, business 
opportunities were rare, unless a business player collaborated with another 
more established business in the market. This discussion will begin with 
lessons from the adoption of the law, its development, and the challenges 
ahead.  
 
 
 ∗ All Indonesian language sources were verified by Eric Buntoro. Due to circumstances 
beyond this Law Review’s control, we have relied on the integrity of this Author for facts asserted 
herein that are not supported by a citation.  
 ∗∗  Dr. Maarif is a lecturer of competition law at several universities in Indonesia and is the 
Chairman of Indonesian Anti-Monopoly Authority. This paper was presented at the Conference on 
Competition Policy and Economic Development conducted by The Institute of Law of Chinese 
Academy of Social Science at the Jianghuo Hotel, Beijing, China, on Sept. 18, 2002. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are the writer’s own personal views and do not represent the view of the KPPU 
or its members. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF INDONESIA’S COMPETITION LAW 
A. A Glimpse Into the History of Indonesian Competition Law 
Prior to Asia’s financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia was considered one 
of the most promising countries in Southeast Asia, because it experienced 
phenomenal economic growth in almost all sectors of its economy. 
Indonesia was generally viewed as possessing a promising economic 
future as well as an attractive market for other producer countries.1 This 
impressive growth and the extraordinary achievements of the Indonesian 
economy before 1997 are clearly depicted in a report by Hal Hill: 
The Indonesia of the mid-1990s is almost unrecognizable in a 
comparison with that of the mid-1960s. From the despair of the 
earlier period, the new regime was able to engineer an amazingly 
rapid recovery, as manifested in sharply declining inflation and 
rising growth. Indeed, a little more than a decade on, Indonesia was 
being hailed as one of the Asia’s success stories. Economists cite 
Indonesia from 1966 to 1968 as one of the most swift and effective 
instances of inflation control in the 20th century. By the late 1980’s 
Indonesia was being classified among the select group of 
developing countries destined shortly to become newly-
industrialized economies following the successful path of Asia’s 
outward-looking industrial economies.2  
Indonesia’s rapid economic growth, however, was criticized by some 
as having been built upon the government’s over-active role. More 
specifically, this role consited of the over-regulation of business in general 
(and small businesses in particular), the ownership of vast state-
enterprises, and the support of crony capitalism. These policies were 
manifested in government-granted import and trading monopolies and 
 
 
 1. ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA IN THE 1990S 57-59 (Westview Press 
1995). For more details, see RIZAL RAMLI, DEREGULATION: A CRITICAL EVALUATION (Center for 
Policy and Implementation Studies, Working Paper, Feb. 27, 1999).  
 2. HAL HILL, THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 3-8 (2000). Hill, however, also warns that:  
Viewed from a 1965 perspective Indonesia’s performance has been better than most observers 
would have dared to hope for. But the record provides no grounds for complacency . . . . 
Thus, while economic circumstances are no longer as desperate as they were in the 1960s, the 
challenges to policy-makers in the 1990s are in many respects just as formidable. 
Hal Hill, The Economy, in INDONESIA’S NEW ORDER: THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION 54, 56 (1994), cited in Frances Hanks et al., A Competition Law For Indonesia: 
Report of the ELIPS Project for the Coordinating Ministry for Economy, Finance, and Development 
Supervision of the Republic Indonesia 6 (1996).  
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favored access to government contracts and State bank credit.3 Not 
surprisingly, economic development during this period was heavily 
influenced by corruption and rent-seeking behavior.4 Those who sought 
passage of an Indonesian competition law capable of taking on these 
abuses were unsuccessful in their reform efforts.5 
B. The Development of Competition Law in Indonesia 
In the past, several Indonesian laws and regulations have attempted to 
regulate fair business competition.6 Provisions appeared in several laws, 
such as Article 382 bis of the Criminal Code, Article 1365 of the Civil 
Code, Law Number 5 of 1984 on Industry, and Articles 7 and 104 of Law 
Number 1 of 1995 on Companies, all of which limit the possibility of 
monopolistic practices through mergers. The problem is that these 
provisions are so general and simple that they prove ineffective to restrict 
business players from practicing unfair trade. Another problem is that 
Indonesia does not have a strong and effective law enforcement 
mechanism. This latter problem only worsened over the years prior to the 
implementation of Law Number 5.7  
The idea of formulating a comprehensive policy regarding business 
competition eventually appeared in the mid 1980s,8 but it was soon 
abandoned and forgotten. Although a number of modest efforts were 
partially undertaken by the government9 for the purpose of drafting the 
Business Competition Law, little was actually accomplished. In 1992, the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (“PDI”) constructed a draft called the 
Simulation of Economic Competition Law, but for various reasons the 
Government did not take the bill into consideration.10  
 
 
 3. Summary of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair 
Business Competition, Hadiputranto, Hadinoto & partners.  
 4. KPPU Press Release, Potret Persaingan Usaha Indonesia 2001, Merajut Benang Kusut 
Antara Moral, Perilaku dan Carut Marutnya Kebijakan, Dec. 2001, 2.  
 5. KWIEK KIAN GIE, SAYA BERMIMPI JADI KONGLOMERAT 243-44 (1993).  
 6. See Cooperatives Law Number 5 of 1992, Small Medium Businesses Law Number 9 of 
1995, and Consumer Protection Law Number 8 of 1999.  
 7. BINZIAD KADAFI ET AL., ADVOKAT INDONESIA MENCARI LEGITIMASI 2-13 (2001).  
 8. The idea was presented by Vice Cabinet Secretary Bambang Kesowo, in the Draft of Ant-
Monopoly Law, A New Wind of Change in the Area of Trade, Gatra, May 25, 1995. Christiano 
Wibisono also stated the need for an Anti-Monopoly Law since 1975.  
 9. For example, in 1995, Trade Minister SB Judono states that his ministry (Ministry of Trade, 
prior to its amalgamation into the Ministry of Industry and Trade) was preparing a bill regarding 
business competition. Id.  
 10. Id.  
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It was not until 1997, when the financial crisis demonstrated that 
Indonesia lacked a clean policy for determining what constitutes fair and 
unfair business competition, that the government realized that Indonesia 
also lacked any mechanism for systematically dealing with business actors 
whose practices cut against the principles of free and fair competition.11  
In an attempt to end the economic crisis, the Government of Indonesia 
signed a Letter of Intent (“LOI”) as part of an International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) loan-rescue program in January of 1998. Among the fifty points 
outlined in the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding, the 
Indonesian government undertook as a high priority the implementation of 
a program of government deregulation. The government’s plans for 
deregulation appeared in seven Presidential Decrees, three Government 
Decrees, and six Presidential Instructions.12 Part of the IMF-ordered 
deregulation prohibits the Indonesian Government from protecting the 
“cronies” that cause market distortions. I 
As part of the commitment stated in the LOI, the Government of 
Indonesia agreed to enact a law to ensure free and fair business 
competition. This condition was met by Law Number 5 of 1999, which 
came into effect in March of 2000. The law regulates fair business 
practices and prohibits monopolistic behavior and unfair competition by 
defining and circumscribing business conduct that harms competition 
through prohibited agreements, prohibited conduct, unfair business 
practices, and abuse of dominant position.  
C. KPPU: Competition Authority 
To ensure its implementation, Law Number 5 of 1999 established a 
Commission known as Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (“KPPU”). 
KPPU was officially established by the Presidential Decree No. 75 of 
1999, dated July 8, 1999,13 and the commissioners were appointed by the 
Presidential Decree No. 162/M of 2000, dated June 7, 2000. The 
 
 
 11. Achmad Shauki, Competition Problems in Indonesia, Paper presented at FEUI Seminar 
[Sumbangan Pemikiran FEUI pada Reformasi dan Pemulihan Ekonomi], Nov. 1998.  
 12. The Presidential Decrees are Keppres No 20/1998, that revoked the special facilities 
conferred on the National Car project “Mobnas”; Keppres No 15/1998, that revoked Bulog’s 
monopoly over agricultural products except for rice; and Keppres No 21/1998, that abandoned Badan 
Penyangga Pemasaran Cengkeh (BPPC). HARIAN SUARA MERDEKA, REFORMASI EKONOMI DIMULAI 
(1998).  
 13. Presidential Decree No. 75/1999.  
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Commission consists of eleven members from different backgrounds of 
expertise appointed to serve for a period of five years.14  
The KPPU is designed to be an independent agency that is free from 
government control and interference.15 In order to assure its independent 
position, commission members are appointed or dismissed by the 
President upon approval of the House of Representatives and are obliged 
to make reports to the President and the House of Representatives.16  
Similar to other competition commissions in various other countries, 
the KPPU has a wide range of duties and authorities. The main duties of 
the KPPU are as follows:17  
1. Conducting evaluations of agreements that could result in the 
occurrence of monopolistic practices and unfair business 
competition;  
2. Conducting evaluations of business activities and/or business 
actors that could result in the occurrence of monopolistic practices 
and unfair business competition;  
3. Imposing sanctions in accordance with the authority of the 
Commissioners;  
4. Providing suggestions and consideration on government policies 
regarding monopolistic practices and/or unfair business 
competition;  
5. Establishing guidelines and/or publications regarding Law No. 
5/1999;  
6. Providing periodical reports on the activity results of the 
Commission to the President and the House of Representatives.  
In addition to fulfilling the above duties, the KPPU is equipped with a 
wide range of powers that consists of:18  
1. Receiving reports from the public and/or business actors 
concerning allegations of monopolistic practices and/or unfair 
business competition;  
 
 
 14. Presidential Decree No. 162/M 2000.  
 15. Law No. 5 of 1999, art. 30, ¶ 3.  
 16. See id. art. 31, ¶ 2.  
 17. Id. art. 35.  
 18. Id. art. 36.  
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2. Conducting investigations of allegations of any business activity 
and/or actions by business actors that might cause monopolistic 
practices and/or unfair business competition;  
3. Conducting investigations and/or examinations of allegation 
cases of monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition 
reported by the public or by business actors or based on the findings 
by the Commissioners as a result of its investigation;  
4. Concluding the results of the investigation and/or examination 
whether there is any monopolistic practices and/or unfair business 
competition or not;  
5. Summoning business actors alleged to have violated the 
provisions of Law No. 5/1999;  
6. Summoning and bringing witnesses, expert witnesses and 
anybody considered knowing of any violation to the provisions of 
Law No. 5/1999;  
7. Requesting assistance from the investigators to bring the business 
actors, witness, expert witness or anybody as referred to under 
Paragraph (e) and (f) of this article, who are not willing to fulfill the 
summons by the Commissioners to appear;  
8. Requesting information from the Government agency with regard 
to the investigation and/or examination of the business actors 
violating provisions of Law No. 5/1999.  
9. Obtaining, investigating and/or evaluating letters, documents, or 
other evidence for the purpose of investigation and/or examination;  
10. deciding and determining if there is any loss or not suffered by 
other business actors or the public;  
11. Deciding and determining if there is any loss or not suffered by 
other business actors or the public; 
12. Notifying the Commissioner’s decision to the business actors 
alleged of conducting monopolistic practices and/or unfair business 
competition; and 
13. Imposing administrative sanction to the business actors violating 
provisions of Law No. 5/1999.  
The KPPU is Indonesia’s first independent regulatory commission. It is 
not a part of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/8
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The KPPU may investigate alleged violations of the law based on a 
written complaint or upon its own initiative.19  
During its first year, the KPPU established important ground rules for 
its operations. Many similar commissions in other countries may take 
longer to establish and make progress with their contributions to the 
enforcement of the Competition Law. However, by the end of 2001 the 
KPPU had handled forty cases, received thirty-seven complaints from 
consumers, and initiated three cases of its own initiative.20  
The first KPPU verdict was upheld on April 20, 2001. The KPPU 
found that the three bidders were guilty of bid-rigging in a bid conducted 
by Caltex Pacific Indonesia (“PT. CPI”) for supplying pipes to the oil 
company. The bid-rigging scheme involved exchanging bid prices among 
bidders at a meeting the night before bidding commenced. PT. CPI was 
also held guilty of failing to “exercise adequate prudence in ensuring the 
fair business competition process.”  
The Commission found that PT. CPI should have expected that 
collusion would occur in the course of the bidding process. The KPPU 
ruled that the contract between PT. CPI and PT. Citra,21 the lowest and 
winning bidder, be nullified, and that the entire bidding process 
recommence. PT. CPI accepted the verdict and did not contest the KPPU’s 
decision in court.22  
The decision attracted a variety of opinions. Some believe that in their 
first case, the KPPU performed well. The process of investigation and 
information gathering was thorough and diligent. The KPPU was able to 
obtain information from the correct sources.23 Each party was given an 
opportunity to testify and present their evidence. Another positive remark 
was that due process was observed and the matter was resolved within the 
time frame set forth in Law Number 5 of 1999.24 The KPPU’s decision 
was also transparent, and substantial evidence regarding the violation 
existed. 
 
 
 19. Markus Meier, Introduction to Competition Law & Policy, and Indonesia’s Competition Law 
& Business Competition Commission, paper presented to the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Jakarta 14, Sept. 6-7, 2001 (text on file with author).  
 20. KPPU Press Release, at 12.  
 21. The bidders were PT. Purna Bina Nusa, PT. Patraindo Nusa Pertiwi, and PT. Citra Turbindo 
Tbk.  
 22. See Putusan Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, Nomor: 01/KPPU-L-I/2000, Apr. 20, 2001.  
 23. Articles 36, 39, 40, and 41 of Law Number 5 of 1999 stipulate that during examinations the 
Commission may summon the business actors or other allegedly potential parties to submit evidence, 
attend, provide information, but not to evade investigation. Evidence that may be used during 
examinations are: witness testimony, expert testimony, documents, and correspondence.  
 24. Law Number 5 of 1999, arts. 39, 43, 44.  
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II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT 
A. Competition Law and Other Laws 
Law Number 5 of 1999 explicitly states the objectives of Indonesian 
competition policy. According to Articles 2 and 3, the objective of the 
Law is to maintain public order, improve efficiency and people’s welfare, 
create an atmosphere of fair competition, inhibit monopolistic practices 
and unfair business competition, and realize effectiveness and efficiency in 
all business sectors.25 Several of the Law’s objectives, such as public 
welfare, consumer welfare,26 and efficiency27 can be achieved through the 
process of fair business competition. 
Following the enactment of Law Number 5 of 1999 during the Special 
General Assembly, the People’s Consultative Assembly (“MPR”) 
reaffirmed the goals of economic reform.28 Decree No. XVI/MPR/1998 on 
 
 
 25. Id. Ch. 2, arts. 2, 3. 
 26. Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law, English Version, 
OECD, Paris, 1993, 15. Consumer Welfare in competition law refers to individual benefits derived 
from the consumption of goods and services. In theory, individual welfare is defined by an individual’s 
own assessment of his/her satisfaction, given prices and income. Exact measurement of consumer 
welfare, therefore, requires information about individual preferences. In practice, applied welfare 
economics uses the notion of consumer surplus to measure consumer welfare. When measured over all 
consumers, consumer surplus is a measure of aggregate consumer welfare. In anti-trust applications, 
some argue that the goal is to maximize consumer surplus, while others argue that the producers’ 
benefits should also be counted. 
 27. Id. at 41. Efficiency in the context of industrial organization, economics, and competition law 
and policy relates to the most effective manner of utilizing scarce resources. Two types of efficiency 
are generally distinguished: technological (or technical) and economic (or allocative). A firm may be 
more technologically efficient than another if it produces the same level of output with one or fewer 
physical number of inputs. Because of different production processes, not all firms may be 
technologically efficient or comparable. Economic efficiency arises when inputs are utilized in a 
manner such that a given scale of output is produced at the lowest possible cost. Unlike technological 
efficiency, economic efficiency enables the comparison of diverse production processes. Efficiency 
increases the probability of business survival and success and the probability that scarce economic 
resources are being put to their highest possible uses. At the firm level, efficiency arises primarily 
through economies of scale and scope and, over a longer period, through technological change and 
innovation. 
 28. Decrees Nos. X/MPR/1998,. XVI/MPR/1998. MPR Decree RI No. X/MPR/1998 on the 
Principles of Development Reform in Accordance with the Rescue and Normalization of National Life 
as the Nation’s Philosophy,  Chapter II, General Condition, Sub A. (Economy) it reads:  
The development achieved during the 32 years of the New Order regime has substantially 
declined because of the serious economic crisis that started in the middle of 1997 and 
continues. The earlier economic foundation was presumed strong, but in fact has shown that it 
was not resistant to external turmoil and this is exacerbated with micro- and macro economic 
problems. This is due to the inadequate implementation of national economic policy, that is 
not in accordance with the guidance under Article 33 of the 1945 constitution where it shows 
clear monopolistic practices. The businesses, that are closed to the elite government officials 
received substantial special priorities, that has further led to a social gap and other problems. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/8
p333 Maarif book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COMPETITION LAW IN INDONESIA 341 
 
 
 
 
Political Economy in Accordance with Economic Democratization also 
provided guidance as to the new Indonesian paradigm for economic 
development.29 The decree demonstrates that the Indonesian government 
has learned from the past and realized that the economic crisis and market 
distortion existed because of weak economic foundations, serious 
structural problems, and government policies favoring a few dominant 
conglomerates. In order to prevent this sequence of events from occurring 
in the future, the MPR explicitly stated its new terms in MPR Decree No. 
IV/MPR/1999 on the State Policy Framework and the General Conditions 
in Chapter III of the Vision and Mission of the State economic policy.  
Consequently, Indonesia has developed a strong foundation, both legally 
and judicially, in its efforts to implement new economic reform objectives.  
At present, Indonesia faces economic and trade liberalization and must 
implement its deregulation plan by improving its laws. Indonesia is also in 
the process of adapting to a new market economy. Competition law is a 
necessary element in a modern economy, because it provides a code of 
conduct that steers business actors towards fair competitive behavior. By 
providing a strong foundation for competition among businesses, the State 
also commits to preserve the process of competition itself.30  
The economic goal of such a policy is to promote consumer welfare 
through the efficient use and allocation of resources, to develop new and 
improved products, and to introduce new production, distribution, and 
 
 
The fundamental weakness was also due to the exclusion of the people’s economy, that in fact 
relies on the natural resource base and human resources as comparative and competitive 
advantages. The existence of conglomerates and a few strong business actors, not supported 
with the true spirit of entrepreneurship, has caused the economic resistance to become 
tenuous and noncompetitive.  
Id. See also MPR RI Decree No. X/MPR/1998 on the Principals of Development Reform and 
Normalization of National Existence as Nation’s Policy.  
 29. See Decree No. XIV/MPR/1998, art. 2. It states that economic policy should be focused on 
the formation of structuring the national economy in realization of substantial small and medium 
business entrepreneurship, and also the formation of interdependency and mutual partnership for 
small, medium, and cooperative businesses entrepreneurship, including private businesses and 
conglomerates. State national companies (BUMN) should also achieve economic democratization and 
national efficiency with high competitive ability. Article 5 states that small and medium sized 
enterprises and cooperatives are a mainframe of the national economy and should receive equal 
opportunities, support, protection, and thorough development. Benefits would accrue to the private 
sector without discarding attention to state-owned companies (BUMN). Article 6 states that 
conglomerates and BUMN shall possess the right to conduct business and manage natural resources 
with a fair business philosophy and partnership with small/medium sized businesses and cooperatives. 
Article 7 provides that the management and use of land and other natural resources shall be fairly 
executed by avoiding all concentrated power and ownership in terms of developing small, medium, 
and cooperative business and the people.  
 30. R. Shyam Khemani, Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and 
Policy, WORLD BANK OECD 1 (1999).  
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organizational techniques for putting economic resources to beneficial use. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the primary function of competition 
law is to protect and promote competitive conduct and not to protect 
individual competitors.31  
Having learned the positive impact of business competition, a number 
of regulations and laws include fair business competition provisions in 
their articles, such as the Telecommunication Law. Article 10 of the 
Telecommunication Law explicitly stipulates that monopolistic behavior 
and unfair business competition conduct are strictly prohibited in the 
telecommunications sector.32  
The telecommunications sector is one of the business sectors that the 
government has strong influence over. This provision has, to some extent, 
forced the government to reform the telecommunications sector, 
particularly with regard to long-established fixed-line services that have 
long been established. Recently, the Indonesian Government announced 
its decision to change its policy on fixed-line services from monopoly to 
duopoly, beginning on August 1, 2002. Now, the fixed-line sector is 
served by two national providers, Telkom and Indosat.33 The shift to the 
duopoly model has proven that business competition is recognized as an 
important part of creating a healthier climate for businesses.  
The goal of creating a fair competition regime has also affected other 
laws, such as the Oil and Gas Law and the Electricity Law. In these laws, 
the Government of Indonesia acknowledged the importance of 
competition and its positive impact for all business activities.  
B. The Impact of Competition Law on Business Sectors 
Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices and Unfair Business Competition requires business actors to 
compete on a relatively level playing field. The goals of the law include 
safeguarding the public interests, improving the efficiency of the national 
economy as a means of improving the people’s welfare, creating 
effectiveness and efficiency in business operations, securing equal 
 
 
 31. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).  
 32. See Law No. 36 of 1999, art. 10 (concerning telecommunication).  
 33. Over the past several years, the fixed line sector was being monopolized by Telkom as the 
State Enterprise before the government finally announced its policy to open the telecommunication 
market. Particularly, the fixed line sector was to be opened for participation by other companies. See 
also Blueprint of Indonesia’s Telecommunication Sector (Minister of Telecommunication Decree No. 
72/1999 concerning Blueprint). 
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business opportunities, and preventing monopolistic and unfair business 
practices.34  
It has to be recognized that not all business actors are completely aware 
of the substance of Law Number 5 of 1999. Unfair business practices such 
as bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation are considered common 
business practices, and are frequently practiced by business actors. Bid 
rigging, for instance, can be easily found in a tender offer situation, 
particularly in the government procurement area. Currently, seventy 
percent of the reports received by the KPPU are related to conspiracy in a 
tender offer, either in the area of government procurement or the private 
sector. The KPPU’s first decision also dealt with bid rigging in a tender 
offer.35 Bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation, in addition to 
being frequently found in Indonesia, are also practiced through many 
business associations in Indonesia.36  
However, recent developments have shown us that gradual changes in 
the behavior of business actors have occurred. Business actors are now 
more concerned with agreements or other business behavior that could 
lead to violations of Law Number 5. These business actors are now more 
cautious about the decisions they make and policies they adopt.  
Airfare competition in the National Airlines industry is one example of 
how the competition law was effective. Competition law forced these 
airlines to reduce the cost of their airfare in order to compete with other 
airlines.37 Years ago, when the National Airlines industry was heavily 
regulated and still closed to new entrants, the airfare was set by the 
Association of Indonesia’s National Air Carrier by agreement that fixed 
prices between competitors. Consumers were forced to pay high airfare 
costs and waive somewhat unprofessional services provided by the 
airlines. Now, everything has changed; consumers are now able to select 
their preferred airline based on a variety of airfares and services.  
Having various competitors in the airline industry has made all national 
airlines fiercely compete in order to survive. As a result of the KPPU’s 
recommendation to the government to revoke the Association’s authority 
to set the airfare scheme, the Association of Indonesia’s National Air 
 
 
 34. Law No. 5 of 1999, art. 3(a)–(d). 
 35. See PT Caltex Pacific Indonesia’s decision, Putusan Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, 
Nomor: 01/KPPU-L/2000 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See also Harian Jawa Pos, Perang Tarif Antar Maskapai Makin Seru (1) (2002). 
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Carrier policy on airfare is no longer referenced on all Indonesian airline 
airfare.38  
Similar circumstances also surround taxi tariffs in the Jakarta region. 
The Jakarta Land Transportation Association forced its members to 
comply with its decision to increase taxi tariffs.39 The Association’s 
authority to set tariffs for taxi fares is based on a Ministry of 
Transportation decree, which allows the private association of taxi 
companies to set taxi tariffs. The KPPU, with the authority given by Law 
Number 5 of 1999, sent a letter to the Ministry of Transportation, 
explaining that the Ministry’s decree would likely result in higher taxi 
prices for consumers and could harm competition.40 Now, one finds that 
taxi companies are no longer implementing the same tariffs for their 
services.  
III. OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 
Undeniably, many obstacles arose during the three-year 
implementation of competition law in Indonesia. Most of these obstacles 
arose because of unclear provisions or articles in Law Number 5 of 1999 
and the lack of publicity of the substantive contents of competition law. In 
this respect it should be noted that many of the ambiguous provisions in 
Law Number 5 relate to the enforcement of competition law.  
The vagueness of these provisions hastriggered various criticisms and 
comments, particulary from the legal community. For example, the Law 
Number 5 of 1999 provides for a mechanism by which any objections to 
the KPPU’s decision can be submitted to the district court.41 This 
mechanism, however, has never been recognized in the civil or criminal 
procedural laws in Indonesia. Indonesia’s procedural laws only recognize 
the for appeal, cassation, and contesting of decisions.42  
The vagueness of the objection mechanism was shown in the recent 
KPPU decision on the Indomobil tender. In the Indomobil case,43 the 
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KPPU legally and conclusively convicted eight business actors for 
violating Article 22 of Law Number 5 of 1999. The KPPU imposed 
various ranges of fines on the eight convicted parties. The convicted 
parties contested the decision and brought it to the district court. However, 
due to the unfamiliar and unregulated nature of the process, the court had 
difficulties determining how to treat the objection process. One of the 
questions that arose was whether the objection to the decision included the 
substantive, material, or procedural issues, because the law does not 
clearly explain whether the judge should examine substantive, material, or 
procedural issues.  
In addition, the concept that the KPPU is unable to become a party 
during the trial complicated the court’s determination of the appropriate 
objection process.44 The different perceptions of the KPPU and the court 
with regard tot eh procedures under Law Number 5 of 1999 also 
contributed to the uncertainty of the process.  
Another issue that became an obstacle in the implementation of 
competition law in Indonesia is the concept of an independent commission 
as the enforcer of competition law. The KPPU has a wide-range of 
authority, including a role similar to judicial institutions, which has caused 
controversy among law enforcers. Some people are afraid that the KPPU 
could abuse its expansive power for the benefit of particular people or 
political parties. These people believe that the extensive role of the KPPU 
violates the prevailing procedural laws. They argue that none of the other 
law enforcement agencies have such extensive powers, including the 
power to investigate, prosecute, and convict. As a result, they believe that 
justice will be jeopardized because the mandate appears to include matters 
that touch upon the competency of the police department, the public 
prosecutor, and the courts.45 Therefore, it is very important to publicize 
Indonesia’s competition law, particularly to permit law enforcers to avoid 
the misperception of the extensive role of the Competition Commission. 
One method of avoiding this misperception is by conducting comparative 
studies with the role of similar Competition Commissions in other 
countries. 
The misperception and other weaknesses of the law should be viewed 
as important lessons in the further study of the implementation of 
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competition law, and should not become barrier to the implemention of the 
competition law in Indonesia. The solution to all of the problems will not 
be immediately visible. The KPPU and law enforcement authorities must 
learn from the process by strengthening the knowledge, which, in the long 
run, could be reflected in their decisions. This may also lead to the 
improvement of procedural law. An open alternative to amend the law will 
certainly appear in the future; however, an amendment is not ultimately 
the best improvement.  
In developing and understanding the concept of competition, economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare must correlate with the improvement of 
the procedural law and the ability of law enforcers. In the end, it is not 
always easy to translate the focus of the law because it could lead to future 
uncertainty, especially for a law that is considered new and vague. Hence, 
law enforcement authorities must be able to understand and interpret the 
purposes of the law and find a common vocabulary in order to align the 
interest of all those affected.  
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